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Although they line up so nicely in the Bill of Rights, our 
constitutional rights have been seen brawling like gladiators, and not 
infrequently.  Almost always on the scene, and frequently starting the 
fight, is the First Amendment.  From campaign contributions to 
prayer in schools to political protest, free speech promises to take on 
anyone—privacy, public order, even the now-ubiquitous national 
security. 
                                                          
* Tiffany Keast is a 2001 graduate of University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law and is now a civil rights litigator in San Jose, California.  The author offers special 
thanks to professors Mark Aaronson, Shauna Marshall, and David Levine. 
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In the 1990s one volatile forum for this debate was demonstration 
at health care clinics where abortions were performed.  
Demonstrators sometimes threatened, harassed, and assaulted 
patients, visitors, and staff, while at other times they simply handed 
out leaflets and asked people passing to listen for a moment.  Many of 
those “people passing” experienced demonstration activity as a 
violation of their Constitutional rights to privacy, medical treatment, 
and practicing their livelihood.  Some asked for the courts’ help in 
protecting their rights.  As the demonstrations became more 
dramatic, a difficult and lengthy battle began to play itself out in the 
courts and in the legislatures.  Legislatures enacted laws and courts 
granted injunctions.  Difficult cases retooled constitutional analysis as 
we sought to balance our rights. 
Until Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., both statutes and 
injunctions that restricted speech faced the same level of 
constitutional scrutiny: intermediate scrutiny.1  However, a series of 
difficult cases involving injunctions led the U.S. Supreme Court to 
conclude in Madsen that speech-restrictive injunctions should face 
stricter scrutiny than statutes.2  After Madsen and its progeny, an 
injunction must “burden no more speech than necessary to serve a 
significant government interest.”3  Though the Court attempted to 
resolve the problems of conflicting rights, Madsen raised a whole new 
set of challenges: are speech-restrictive injunctions necessarily 
content-based?  Who can be enjoined?  Are injunctions really 
deserving of higher scrutiny than statutes?  Can the reviewing court 
raise government interests that the government has not pled, and 
what function can those state interests play in the analysis?  What 
factual findings are necessary to support a speech-restrictive 
injunction?  In short, how is it possible for a court to craft an 
injunction that protects listeners, protesters, and the Constitution 
itself?4 
This Paper will examine these dilemmas.  Part I assesses the pre-
Madsen state of injunctive relief in cases involving free speech.5  Part 
                                                          
 1. See 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (evaluating whether an injunction requiring a 
buffer zone between public demonstrations and an abortion clinic “passes muster 
under the First Amendment”). 
 2. See id. at 764-65 (justifying a more stringent review—strict scrutiny—based on 
the fact that judges can tailor injunctions to provide more targeted restraint of 
speech). 
 3. Id. at 765. 
 4. See id. at 764 (noting that injunctions are court-created solutions aimed at 
halting specific violations). 
 5. See infra Part I (providing a background as to how courts issue injunctions 
restricting speech). 
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II traces the rise through the lower courts of the two most important 
Supreme Court decisions on this point: Madsen and Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York.6  Part III addresses the 
questions raised above, as analyzed in Madsen, Schenck, and a more 
recent case involving statutory restrictions on speech, Hill v. 
Colorado.7 
I.  PRE-MADSEN ANALYSIS OF SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS AND 
STATUTES 
Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that can have prohibitory 
and/or mandatory effects, meaning it can prohibit or require certain 
activities, or both.8  Most injunctions are prohibitory, and thus forbid 
the enjoined party from an act that harms another.9  While generally 
a matter of judicial discretion, because of the potentially sweeping 
coverage of injunctive relief, that discretion is not absolute and is 
subject to general principles governing equitable remedies.10  
Accordingly, when crafting an injunction, a court should consider 
such equitable issues as irreparable injury and lack of an adequate 
remedy at law.11 
Injunctions that restrict free speech are subject to constitutional 
challenge because they put the government’s weight behind that 
restriction: a court orders it, and state officers enforce it.12  When an 
injunction will limit the enjoined party’s free speech, it is subject to 
the same analysis as a statute or ordinance that restricts free speech.13  
                                                          
 6. See 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding an injunction that created a fixed “buffer 
zone” around an abortion clinic); infra Part II (analyzing examples of cases where 
courts have issued injunctions restricting speech). 
 7. See 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (affirming the validity of a Colorado statute that had 
the effect of prohibiting abortion protesters from coming within eight feet of patients 
entering and exiting an abortion clinic); infra Part III (analyzing specific cases in 
issuance of injunctions). 
 8. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “injunction” as “[a] 
court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding 
someone to undo some wrong or injury”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  788 (7th 
ed. 1999) (listing types of injunctions including mandatory (“orders an affirmative act 
or mandates a specified course of conduct”) and preventive (“designed to prevent a 
loss or injury in the future”)). 
 9. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759 (forbidding abortion protestors from taking 
various actions). 
 10. See State Corp. Comm’n of Kan. v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 568 (1934) 
(stating that courts should not grant injunctions “unless necessary to protect rights 
against injuries otherwise irremediable”). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 561. 
 12. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770 (demonstrating the government’s high 
level of commitment to enforcing an injunction).  Where a narrower injunction has 
failed to provide relief, a court may extend or broaden the original injunction.  Id. 
 13. See id. at 765 (requiring courts to test whether the injunction burdens “no 
3
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That analysis initially turns on whether the injunction or law is 
“content-based,” i.e., based on the speech’s content, or “content-
neutral,” i.e., made without reference to speech’s content.14  The type 
of forum (public or private) in which the speech takes place and the 
public and private interests the injunction is supposed to address are 
also important factors.15  Depending on how the reviewing court uses 
that analytical framework, a pre-Madsen injunction or law must pass 
either “intermediate scrutiny,” as delineated by Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism16 or “strict scrutiny,” as described in Carey v. Brown.17 
A content-neutral injunction or law is one made “without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech.”18  Pre-Madsen, if a court 
found an injunction to be content-neutral, it had to pass 
“intermediate scrutiny,” under which restrictions on the time, place, 
and manner of speech were lawful as long as they were narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open 
ample alternative channels of communication.19  In contrast, if a 
court found an injunction to be content-based (made with reference 
to the speech’s content), the injunction had to pass “strict scrutiny”: it 
had to be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly 
drawn to achieve that interest.20 
Once content-neutrality is assessed, the court must analyze the 
nature of the place where the speech occurs.21  Courts are highly 
protective of demonstration in a public forum regarding matters of 
                                                          
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest”). 
 14. See id. at 762 (assessing whether the injunction in question was “content or 
viewpoint based”). 
 15. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796 (1989).  The 
Supreme Court is divided on whether the Ward language, although the most 
common statement of the test, is the primary test, the only test, or only one of several 
tests that should be used in deciding content neutrality. Id.  See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 
746 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 16. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (scrutinizing whether an ordinance was narrowly 
drawn to achieve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative 
channels of communication). 
 17. See 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (determining whether a statute was necessary 
to serve a “substantial” state interest and was finely tailored to achieve that end). 
 18. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
 19. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (noting that courts would uphold restrictions on the time, place, and manner 
of the speech if they were tailored narrowly to serve a significant government interest 
and left open ample alternative channels of communication). 
 20. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62 (applying strict scrutiny to an Illinois statute). 
 21. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
799-800 (1985) (recognizing the “Combined Federal Campaign” as a public forum 
under First Amendment analysis). 
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public concern and generally will only uphold content-neutral 
restrictions in such a venue.22  In numerous cases, the Court has 
reiterated that streets and sidewalks are the “classic” public fora.23 
The court then must consider the nature of the interest the state is 
asserting in seeking to enjoin the speakers.24  Courts have found that 
protecting public safety, ensuring order,25 providing law enforcement 
officials with clear instructions,26 and protecting patients’ rights to 
seek medical treatment27 all constitute valid state interests.28 
One major difficulty starts at the very base of the issue: what is 
“speech?”  Is conduct “speech?”  Can it become “speech?”  Or is 
conduct merely the manner in which “speech” takes place?  
Separating “speech” from “conduct,” or even protected speech from 
unprotected, has a long and controversial history.29  Courts have been 
willing to enjoin even peaceful protest activity when it occurs in a 
pervasive violent context.30  For example, in a labor dispute that gave 
rise to window smashing, explosions, stench bombs, vandalism, and 
several severe beatings, the Court enjoined all the protesters,31 while 
                                                          
 22. See id. at 800 (declaring that the principal purpose of traditional public fora 
is the free exchange of ideas). 
 23. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988) (noting that streets 
and sidewalks are held in trust for the use of the public). 
 24. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (noting that a court may not prohibit all 
communicative activity). 
 25. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Ass’n Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 317 (1941) (noting that courts have great 
authority to protect against threats to public safety). 
 26. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 750 (noting that courts seek to prevent conduct that 
strangles effective law enforcement). 
 27. See, e.g., id. (noting the state’s interest in promoting the health and safety of 
its citizenry). 
 28. See id.; see also Milk Wagon Drivers Ass’n Union of Chicago, Local 753, 312 
U.S. at 317 (recognizing several threats to public safety where states have an interest 
in protecting its citizenry).  This is not an exhaustive list, but in the abortion context 
(and the cases cited in this Paper) these interests are the most frequently asserted by 
the government. 
 29. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969) (protecting a student’s wearing of a black arm band in protest of the Vietnam 
War). 
 30. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., v. Am. Coalition 
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2637 
(2003) (discussing incitement to violence in the abortion context).  In Planned 
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit held that it was proper for a court to consider the 
context in which the statement was made when determining whether a statement 
constituted a “true threat.”  Id. at 1063.  The court found that publishing wild-west-
style “Wanted” flyers that gave pictures, names, and addresses of doctors who 
performed abortions comprised a “true threat,” given the “whole factual context,” 
including the recent murders of several doctors who performed abortions.  Id. 
 31. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, 312 U.S. at 292, 298-99 
(issuing an injunction to protect against continuing intimidation). 
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noting that such an injunction would only be proper if the violence 
truly “colored the entire collective effort” and not merely “the 
conduct of some of the [defendants].”32  The Court has also 
recognized that the government can regulate speech more strictly in 
certain locations, such as in front of a person’s home33 or at a 
workplace.34 
Courts do not protect violence in the context of protest.35  
However, courts may protect speech that is considered merely 
“coercive,”36 “embarrassing,”37 or “intimidating.”38  The difficulty 
ensues from deciding where coercion ends and violence begins.  Thus 
the problem in the context of abortion protest: is it violence for a 
protester to use tactics that inflict upon the listener the risk of medical 
harm? 
II.  MAKING THE CHANGE 
A.  Madsen in the Courts Below 
In September 1992, a Florida state court entered a permanent 
injunction restricting the anti-abortion protests of several groups and 
individuals (“the Madsen defendants”) at a clinic in Melbourne, 
Florida.39  The injunction barred the Madsen defendants from 
                                                          
 32. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982). 
 33. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (noting that such people cannot avoid the 
objectionable speech). 
 34. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 290 F.3d at 1058 
(finding it persuasive that several doctors had been murdered after their pictures 
were posted on the Internet and in other protest group publications).  Whether a 
reproductive health facility could use this “pervasive violence” argument is as yet 
untested but it is certainly arguable.  Abortion protest, in the 1990s at least, occurred 
in a nationwide context of extreme violence—doctors were assassinated in their 
homes, clinic staff received death threats, facilities were bombed, and physical 
altercations broke out at facilities.  Even today, that pervasive violence still persists.  In 
Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit held that a protest group’s posting of, among 
other items, Wild West style “Wanted” ads displaying physicians names, pictures, and 
home addresses constituted a true threat of violence, not merely advocacy of violence, 
and was, therefore, proscribable. 
 35. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 887 (choosing not to impose damages for the 
consequences of violent conduct). 
 36. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 
1082 (recognizing anti-abortion placards as protected by the First Amendment). 
 37. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 910 (noting that the First 
Amendment protects speech that amounts to mere social pressure or the threat of 
social ostracism). 
 38. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 
1063 (noting that the First Amendment protects posters that are intimidating). 
 39. See Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 
1993). 
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blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic and from 
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic.40  Six 
months later, the parties who had sought the injunction moved to 
broaden it.41  During the hearing on that motion, the court found 
that, despite the first injunction, the Madsen defendants continued to 
impede access to the clinic by congregating in the street leading to 
the clinic, marching in the clinic’s driveways, singing, chanting, and 
using loudspeakers and bullhorns.42  The court also heard evidence 
showing that the protests took a physical toll on persons entering the 
clinic, some of whom were expecting surgery and accordingly were 
placed at greater risk during surgical procedures because of 
hypertension, anxiety, and the resulting need to undergo heavier 
sedation.43 
The court then held that its original injunction had not been 
sufficient to protect the “health, safety and rights”44 of area women 
and expanded the injunction to enjoin the defendants from entering 
the premises and property of the clinic, interfering with access to or 
exit from the clinic buildings and property, entering within thirty-six 
feet of the clinic property line, making sounds audible from inside the 
clinic during surgical and recovery periods (7:30 am to noon, Monday 
through Saturday), displaying images observable from inside the 
clinic at those same times, physically approaching anyone within 300 
feet of the clinic unless that person indicated a desire to 
communicate, touching or harassing patients and staff, and inciting 
others to violate the injunction.45 
The Madsen defendants appealed, and the state appellate court 
certified the case for immediate review in the Florida Supreme Court, 
which upheld the injunction.46  The court recognized that the areas 
in which defendants were protesting, a public street and sidewalks, 
were traditional public fora.47 The court also found the injunction to 
be content-neutral because it regulated only “when, where, and how 
                                                          
 40. See id. at 667 n.1 (indicating that the injunction barred numerous activities). 
 41. See id. at 667 (noting that the injunction did not adequately protect the 
health and safety of women using the abortion clinic). 
 42. See id. at 667-68 (explaining in detail the actions of the defendants that 
harmed the women in their use of the abortion clinic). 
 43. See id. at 668 (describing the trauma associated with “running the gauntlet” 
to enter the abortion clinic). 
 44. Id. at 667. 
 45. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-62 (narrowing the permitted behavior in front of 
the abortion clinic). 
 46. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 682. 
 47. See id. at 671. 
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Operation Rescue may speak, not what it may say.  The restrictions 
make no mention whatsoever of abortion or any other political or 
social issue . . . .”48  The court then held that the injunction’s 
provisions were reasonable to protect significant government interests 
in ensuring public safety, the free flow of traffic, and a woman’s right 
to seek medical services.49 
Shortly before the Florida Supreme Court ruled, the Eleventh 
Circuit heard a separate challenge to the same injunction and struck 
the injunction down, finding that it was indeed content-based and 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.50  The Eleventh Circuit noted that 
a 1988 Ninth Circuit opinion upheld a similar injunction, which 
limited demonstrating, distributing literature, shouting, screaming, 
chanting, or yelling by anti-abortion organizations and “those acting 
in concert with them.”51  The Eleventh Circuit understood the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning to be that the injunction was content-neutral 
because it did not mention viewpoint, but only limited the manner of 
expression.52  The court found that reasoning “not at all 
persuasive . . . [An injunction like the one at bar] is no more 
viewpoint-neutral than one restricting the speech of ‘the Republican 
Party, the state Republican Party, George Bush, Bob Dole, Jack Kemp, 
and all persons acting in concert or participation with them or on 
their behalf.’”53 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Madsen to resolve 
the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals on whether the injunction was content-
neutral or content-based.54  The Court ruled in Madsen that the 
injunction was in fact content-neutral, and that content-neutral, 
speech-restrictive injunctions should be judged by a new standard: 
they must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a 
significant government interest.55 
                                                          
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 672. 
 50. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring a 
compelling state interest that is narrowly drawn). 
 51. See id. at 710 n.10 (quoting Portland Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. 
Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 52. See id. (observing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision focused neither on the 
advocates’ viewpoints nor the “general issues raised at their demonstrations”). 
 53. Id. at 710 n.10, 711. 
 54. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762. 
 55. See id. at 776 (upholding the Florida Supreme Court’s noise restrictions and 
“buffer zones” at clinic entrances but striking as unconstitutional the “buffer zone” 
that extended to private property abutting abortion clinics, the “images observable” 
provision, the “300-foot no approach zone,” and the “300-foot no-approach zone 
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B.  Schenck in the Courts Below 
While Madsen worked its way through the courts, another case was 
traveling a similar path in New York.  In 1990, a group of anti-
abortion activists (“Schenck respondents”) began planning large-scale 
blockades of a number of clinic facilities in that state.56  Pro-Choice 
Network of Western New York asked the district court for a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) prohibiting the respondents’ planned 
blockades.57 That order was granted on September 27, 1990.58  The 
district court found that in both “large-scale blockades” and in smaller 
groups, the Schenck respondents consistently attempted to stop or 
impede clinic operations by trespassing on the property and in the 
clinic buildings themselves, crowding around cars, and congregating 
in driveways and doorways, as well as approaching and speaking with 
women entering the clinic, sometimes grabbing and yelling at them.59 
The TRO barred the respondents from physically blockading the 
clinics, physically abusing or tortiously harassing anyone entering or 
leaving the clinics, or “demonstrating within fifteen feet of any 
person” entering or leaving the clinics, with the exception that two 
“sidewalk counselors” at a time could enter this “buffer zone” to have 
a “conversation of a non-threatening nature” with persons entering or 
leaving the clinics, but must “cease and desist” their activity once the 
person indicated she did not wish to be “counseled.”60 
Five civil contempt findings later, the TRO was converted into a 
permanent injunction.61  There were several significant changes 
between the TRO and the injunction.  The injunction expanded the 
fifteen-foot buffer zone around persons entering or leaving the clinic 
to include “demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge 
of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot 
entrances, driveways and driveways entrances” of the clinics or “within 
fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving” the 
clinics.62  In addition, the “two sidewalk counselors” permitted by the 
TRO to enter the buffer zone were required by the injunction to 
                                                          
around [staff] residences”); infra Part III.A. 
 56. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New 
York, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1423 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 57. Id. at 1417. 
 58. Id. at 1422. 
 59. Id. at 1423-27. 
 60. Id. at 1440-41. 
 61. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New 
York, 828 F. Supp. 1018, 1032 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 62. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 367 (referring to these buffer zones respectively as 
“fixed buffer zones” and “floating buffer zones”). 
9
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cease and desist and then move outside the fifteen-foot floating buffer 
zone around persons entering or leaving the clinic.63  The Schenck 
respondents challenged the so-called fixed and floating buffer zones 
and the cease and desist requirement.64 
In analyzing the respondents’ First Amendment challenge, the 
district court found that the injunction was content-neutral because it 
restricted only the “volume, location, timing and harassing and 
intimidating nature of [respondents’] expressive speech.”65  The 
district court cited three significant government interests justifying 
the restriction on free speech: public safety; ensuring that abortions 
are performed safely; and ensuring that a woman’s constitutional 
right to travel and to choose to abort a pregnancy were not sacrificed 
in the interest of respondents’ First Amendment rights.66 
Two respondents sought review in the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.67  While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided Madsen.68  Applying the new Madsen test, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court, but on rehearing en banc, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision and upheld the 
injunction, with the majority of the judges closely tracking the district 
court’s reasoning.69  Two respondents appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which granted certiorari.70 
III.  THE BIG ISSUES AND THE NEW TEST: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 
RULINGS IN MADSEN, SCHENCK, AND HILL 
A.  Are the Injunctions Content-Neutral? 
On the threshold issue of content-neutrality, the Madsen 
defendants argued that the state’s injunction was content-based 
because it restricted only the speech of anti-abortion protesters.71  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Ward and 
noted that the test for content-neutrality is whether the government 
has adopted a regulation of speech “without reference” to the content 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 369. 
 64. Id. at 371. 
 65. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 799 F. Supp. at 1433. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 68. 512 U.S. at 753. 
 69. Id.; Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 393 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
 70. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 516 U.S. 1170 (1996). 
 71. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762. 
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of the speech.72  Rehnquist reasoned that any injunction necessarily 
applies only to a particular person or group and regulates the 
activities of that group: “[t]he fact that the injunction covered people 
with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction 
content or viewpoint based.”73 Rehnquist found that the state enacted 
the broader injunction not because of the defendants’ message, but 
because, in communicating that message, they repeatedly violated the 
state court’s original order.74  He further found that the injunction’s 
lack of prohibitions against pro-abortion demonstrators was explained 
by the lack of violations by any such activists at the Melbourne clinic; 
had pro-abortion activists violated the first order (in which case, oddly 
enough, they would necessarily be “acting in concert with” the anti-
abortion protesters), presumably they would have been enjoined 
under the expanded order.75 
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the injunction was indeed 
content-based.76  Scalia found that if, as the district court and the 
majority argued,77 the injunction was designed to remedy past 
violations and not to suppress a particular viewpoint, the injunction’s 
coverage of others acting “in concert with” the named defendants 
would only bind those who “did certain things.”78  Instead, Scalia 
found, the injunctions bound those who said certain things: the 
injunctions were “tailored to restrain persons distinguished, not by 
proscribable conduct, but by proscribable views.”79  Scalia quoted the 
record several times, including the trial judge’s statements that “in 
concert with means in concert with those who had taken a certain 
position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic,”80 thereby 
finding that “all those who wish to express the same views as the 
named defendants are deemed to be ‘acting in concert or 
participation.’”81 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 763. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 795 (arguing that the injunction was tailored to restrict an entire 
point of view, rather than particular conduct). 
 77. See id. at 762 (holding that as such, strict scrutiny should not be employed). 
 78. Id. at 796-97. 
 79. See Id. 
 80. Id. at 796. 
 81. Id. at 795. After several persons were arrested for walking within the thirty-six-
foot buffer zone, the court stated at a hearing for those individuals, “I understand . . . 
[abortion-rights supporters] were also in the area . . . the Injunction did not pertain 
to [them] because the word in concert with means in concert with those who had 
taken a certain position.”  One defendant asked the court if, when the injunction was 
11
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Scalia found this to be the very essence of a content-based 
restriction and a prior restraint: an infringement upon an individual’s 
expressive conduct before the individual’s conduct has been found 
unlawful.82  Scalia believed that while a speech-restrictive injunction 
might not be designed to target a particular viewpoint, it easily could 
be, and it would almost always have a greater impact on one side of a 
debate.83  “The proceedings before us here illustrate well enough 
what I mean.  The injunction was sought against a single-issue 
advocacy group by persons and organizations with a business or social 
interest in suppressing that group’s point of view.”84 
Using the same reasoning as the Madsen defendants, the Schenck 
defendants argued the injunction against them was also content-
based.  Again writing for the majority, Rehnquist dismissed this 
contention.85  Rehnquist found that the Schenck injunction was 
content-neutral for the same reason the Madsen injunction had 
been—it was based not on the content of the speech, but on the 
defendants’ past unlawful conduct.86  In his dissent, Scalia did not 
address this issue.  Most courts appear to regard this as a settled issue; 
numerous cases have held that injunctions like those at issue in 
Madsen and Schenck are content-neutral.87 
Feeling freed up to examine the statutory field, the Court took 
another crack at content-neutrality in Hill v. Colorado.88  Colorado 
had enacted a state law making it a misdemeanor to “knowingly 
approach another person within eight feet of such person, unless 
                                                          
issued, it was intended to apply only to anti-abortion demonstrators.  The court 
responded, “In effect, yes.”  Id. at 795-96. 
 82. See id. at 797 (maintaining that such a restraint threatened the foundation of 
First Amendment rights). 
 83. Id. at 793. 
 84. Id. While the point may be valid, it ignores the trial court’s errors in designing 
the injunction. A poorly drawn, poorly interpreted, or poorly enforced injunction is 
not necessarily content-based, even if its effect is felt more strongly by one side.  
Neutral drafting and neutral enforcement should be the goal and would not be 
difficult—if so instructed, police can easily arrest anyone trespassing in the buffer 
zone, regardless of that person’s viewpoint or message. 
 85. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 384 (arguing protesters are being silenced due to a 
difference of opinion with patients of the clinics). 
 86. See id. at 384-85 (pointing to past arrests for harassment). 
 87. See, e.g., National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (using the test in Madsen to uphold a permanent injunction 
prohibiting activists from obstructing access to abortion clinic facilities); Lucero v. 
Trosch, 121 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Scott, 187 F.3d 282 (2nd Cir. 
1999); United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001); New York v. Spitzer, 
273 F.3d 184 (2nd Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is content-
neutral). 
 88. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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such other person consents, for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral 
protest, education, or counseling . . . within a radius of one hundred 
feet from the entrance door to a health care facility.”89  A group of 
anti-abortion activists sued, arguing that the statute was 
unconstitutional on its face.90 
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the statute.91  The court 
found that the statute was supported by significant government 
interests in ensuring the safety and unobstructed access to patients 
and staff entering and leaving health care facilities.92  Relying on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Madsen, the court reasoned that the 
statute was content-neutral because “the specific viewpoint of any 
person who protests at a health care facility is not relevant to a 
determination whether a violation of the statute has occurred.”93  The 
statute also did not burden more speech than reasonably necessary 
because protesters could still communicate with their targets at a 
distance of eight feet: “Indeed, the restriction merely is directed at 
depriving protesters of the opportunity to intimidate or make other 
physical contact with the patients or staff.”94 
The Hill protesters also argued that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because the meaning of “knowingly 
approach,” “consent,” “protests,” and “counseling and education” was 
unclear.95  The court found it sufficient to give the legal definition of 
“knowingly” and to finish up by applying the “common sense 
meaning” of the remaining terms (with assistance from Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary).96 
In the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Scott threw a wrench into 
the relevant jurisprudence, opening his majority opinion by stating 
that the case required a determination of “whether a legislative 
enactment designed to protect the privacy rights of citizens . . . unduly 
burdens the First Amendment rights of other citizens.”97  While citing 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 708. 
 90. See id. (contending that the injunction created a chill on their First 
Amendment rights). 
 91. See id. at 711. 
 92. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding 
a statute requiring protesters to stay at least eight feet away from patients of a health 
care facility). 
 93. Id. at 673. 
 94. Id. at 674. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Colo. 1999).  The district court had 
also discussed a “right to be let alone,” but the appellate court ignored this thorny 
problem. Id. at 1259. 
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the statute’s stated purpose of protecting a citizen’s right to seek and 
obtain medical counseling and treatment,98 Justice Scott placed this 
right under the broader “right to privacy” first mentioned by Justice 
Brandeis in an 1890 article and used as the basis for the decision in 
Roe v. Wade.99  Justice Scott gave a fairly in-depth treatment of the 
right to privacy but he appeared wary of relying on it, instead basing 
his opinion on the state interest in protecting a citizen’s “health and 
safety.”100 
Using Ward as its map, the Colorado Supreme Court found the 
statute content-neutral because it “serve[d] purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression.”101  The Court then held the statute was 
constitutional because it was narrowly tailored.102  Justice Scott noted 
that in Ward, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that to be narrowly 
tailored, a statute need not be “‘the least intrusive means’ of achieving 
the desired end.”103  The Court found that the statute left open 
ample alternative channels of communication because the protesters 
could still speak, they just had to speak from eight feet away; there was 
nothing in the statute that would prohibit protesters from being seen 
and heard by their target audience.104 
The Hill protesters appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Stevens, under the Ward analysis, tested the 
statute by whether “the government ha[d] adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it convey[ed].”105  
Stevens found that the statute at issue was content-neutral under the 
Ward test for three reasons.  First, it was not a “regulation of 
speech.”106  Rather, it [was] a regulation of the places where some 
speech may occur.107  Second, the regulation was not adopted 
                                                          
 98. Id. at 1253. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1251.  The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Madsen was a precursor 
for this logic; the court used the government’s interest in protecting residential 
privacy in Frisby and found that medical privacy is an analogous government interest.  
Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 672.  Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Madsen cites Roe v. Wade for the proposition that protection of the freedom to seek 
lawful medical counseling and services is a legitimate government interest.  Madsen, 
512 U.S. at 767-68. 
 101. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1256 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 
 102. Id. at 1257. 
 103. Id. at 1256. 
 104. Id. at 1259. 
 105. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 
 106. Id. at 719. 
 107. Id. 
14
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“because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.”108  
Third, the State’s interests in protecting access and privacy, and 
providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to the 
content of the demonstrators’ speech.109 
Petitioners argued that since the statute would only cover those 
engaged in “protest, education, or counseling,” enforcing it would 
require analyzing the speech involved to assess whether it fit those 
categories, thus making the statute content-based.110  Stevens noted 
that the kind of conduct that is the focus of the statute could in all 
probability be identified as that conduct without reference to the 
actual message being conveyed—if a person approaches someone 
with a leaflet, they are probably counseling, educating, or 
protesting.111 
Stevens also noted that examining the content of a message in 
order to determine the speaker’s purpose is not unusual, as is the case 
in assessing “fighting words,” criminal threats, or a contractual 
offer.112  Further, Stevens argued, the “theoretical” examination 
necessary would be cursory, and it would be supported by precedents 
that barred “picketing” and allowed examination of the speaker’s 
behavior to analyze whether she was indeed “picketing.”113 
Stevens saw the statute as “a minor place restriction on an extremely 
broad category of communications with unwilling listeners.”114  
                                                          
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 719-20. 
 110. Id. at 720. 
 111. Id. at 721. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 722. 
 114. See id. at 723 (explaining that abortion protestors, like used car salesmen and 
fundraisers, are subject to the same eight foot restriction when presenting their 
message to unwilling listeners).  In several places in his argument, Stevens noted the 
difference between “willing” and “unwilling” listeners.  See, e.g., id. at 715-16 (stating 
that the statute in question deals only with the interests of unwilling listeners).  
Stevens relied on earlier cases to remind us that a “captive audience,” with little or no 
opportunity to avoid the offensive speech, has slightly more rights, and the speaker to 
the captive audience has slightly less.  See id. at 718 (referring to a balancing test of 
First Amendment rights of speakers and privacy rights of unwilling listeners (citing 
Erznoznik v. Jacksonwille, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975))).  Scalia wrote in dissent that he 
failed to see how someone walking quickly past a demonstrator on a public sidewalk 
was a captive audience, but this ignores the reality of the situations that have given 
rise to the need for these kinds of injunctions and statutes.  See id. at 753 n.3 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  Scalia’s point (that if protecting access is the real goal, the statute’s 
specific prohibition of blocking or impeding access is sufficient to reach it) is a good 
one, but it ignores the state’s interest in protecting a patient’s health, which can be 
jeopardized by a particularly distressing, face to face encounter with someone calling 
them a murderer, for example.  See id. at 755.  It also ignores the reality, for many 
reasons beyond the scope of this paper, that women and men may perceive what 
constitutes “blocking” or “impeding” differently.  A small woman may find the 
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Souter concurred and added that restrictions solely upon the 
“circumstances of its delivery” were suitable for testing under Ward 
unless they effectively removed a subject or viewpoint from discourse, 
which they did not in this case.115 
Dissenting again, Scalia (presumably by accident) apparently begins 
to give some credence to the idea that abortion is different.116  When 
assessing the rights of those seeking medical services, Scalia examines 
only the text of the statute and refuses to speculate about the effect of 
the text on the reality of abortion protest.117  But, when assessing the 
rights of those demonstrating at medical facilities, Scalia repeatedly 
decries the majority’s practice of ignoring reality:118 whatever a 
statute’s text may say, and however content neutral it may appear, 
“[w]hen applied, as it is [in Hill], at the entrance to medical facilities, 
it is a means of impeding speech against abortion.”119 
To Scalia, then, even an injunction that purports to cover everyone 
(by failing to be more specific) will really only cover some people.  So, 
how about a statute that does attempt to be more specific?  Finding 
validity in both the text of the statute and the reality in which it was 
enacted, CF&I Steel v. United Steel Workers of America assesses 
content-neutrality by examining both.120  Colorado’s Labor Peace Act 
                                                          
“dogging” referred to by Stevens to be a block or an impediment when it is 
performed by a person larger than herself, especially a man.  See id. at 718.  Kennedy 
argued in concurrence that a statute becomes unconstitutionally content-based 
because of its application to the specific locations where it occurs.  See id. at 767 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Stevens replied that “[a] statute making it a misdemeanor 
to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without ordering any food would also not be 
‘content based’ even if it were enacted by a racist legislature that hated civil rights 
protesters.”  Id. at 724. 
 115. Id. at 735-36 (referring to the government’s ability to make restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech).  Souter goes on to make a pleasantly 
concise statement about the content-neutrality problem at issue in this case: “There is 
always a correlation with subject and viewpoint when the law regulates conduct that 
has become the signature of one side of a controversy.  But that does not mean that 
every regulation of such distinctive behavior is content based as First Amendment 
doctrine employs that term.”  Id. at 737. 
 116. See id. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court would have 
decided that the regulation was content-based had the issue been anti-war rather than 
anti-abortion protests).  Scalia charges that the Court’s jurisprudence shifts when it 
considers the abortion issue.  Id. 
 117. See id. at 749 (comparing the interest that the State of Colorado sought to 
protect as stated in the text of the statute with the interest that the Court announced 
it was protecting, which was not derived from the text of the statute). 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 756 (asserting that the Court displays a “willful ignorance” of 
the kinds of communication the statute restricts). 
 119. Id. at 744 (supporting his position that the statute is content-based).  In a 
separate dissent, Kennedy follows a similar “reality based” argument and finds that the 
statute’s coverage of only the entrances to “medical facilities” makes it, in effect, 
content-based. Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 120. See 23 P.3d 1197, 1202 (Colo. 2001) (determining that the Colorado statute 
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prohibited picketing in residential areas about labor disputes.121  The 
lower court issued an injunction barring the defendants from 
residential picketing and held that the defendants had violated the 
Act.122  The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the statute was 
content-based because, by its own terms, the statute only barred 
speech concerning labor disputes.123 
Between CF&I Steel and Hill, it is clear that adherence to Scalia’s 
analysis of content-neutrality would likely render every speech-
restrictive statute and injunction content-based, as Rehnquist noted in 
Madsen.124  An injunction is always ordered in response to the 
activities of an individual or group; under Scalia’s analysis, this would 
render it necessarily content-based and would also render it void for 
over-inclusiveness.125  But a court could also not order an injunction 
that specifically identifies that group by referring to the viewpoint or 
content the group shares because such a reference would make the 
injunction facially invalid according to CF&I Steel.126  Under the logic 
of CF&I Steel and Hill, laws barring solicitation of campaign 
contributions outside a polling place would be necessarily content-
based and would have to pass strict scrutiny.127  Presumably, Scalia 
                                                          
was content-based because it distinguished between lawful and unlawful picketing 
based on the subject matter of the picket).  The court’s reference to context seems to 
suggest that it is proper to look beyond the statute’s terms in analyzing content-
neutrality, but the court did not explain what it meant by “context” and specifically 
stated that the statute was “facially invalid.”  Id.  Why a reviewing court would need to 
examine the “context” if the statute is invalid on its face is unclear. 
 121. 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-108(2)(a) (2000). 
It is an unfair labor practice for an employee, individually or in concert with 
others, to . . . coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of his legal 
rights . . . or to intimidate his family or any member thereof, picket his 
domicile, or injure the person or property of such employee or his family or 
of any member thereof. . . . 
§ 8-3-108(2)(a). 
 122. See CF&I Steel, 23 P.3d at 1198 (finding, however, that the union had not 
authorized or condoned the acts of the individual picketers). 
 123. Id. at 1202 (rejecting the argument that Colorado common law gave courts 
the power to regulate all residential picketing). 
 124. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762 (explaining that all injunctions enjoin specific 
groups based on past acts which may naturally correspond to the group’s message). 
 125. See id. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the true vice of content-
based legislation is that it “lends itself to” rather than is “always” used to stifle a 
specific group’s First Amendment rights). 
 126. See CF&I Steel, 23 P.3d at 1201-02 (deciding that an injunction was content-
based and therefore facially invalid because it enjoined only picketers involved in 
labor disputes). 
 127. Cf. id. at 1202 (holding the injunction content-based because it only 
prohibited speech related to labor disputes); Hill, 530 U.S. at 713 n.19 (affirming that 
the statute was content-neutral because it only restricted time, place, and manner of 
speech). 
17
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approved of the pre-Madsen tiered analysis; his opinions in this line of 
cases are unclear as to whether he would advocate for the outcome 
demanded by the logic of Hill and CF&I Steel. 
B.  Who Can be Enjoined? 
Responding to Scalia’s argument in Madsen that the injunction was 
content-based, Rehnquist, writing for the majority, states that if 
seeking speech restrictive injunctions against particular issue groups 
makes the injunctions content-based, then it would be virtually 
impossible to craft an injunction that was content-neutral.128  
Necessarily, then, it would also be virtually impossible to remedy the 
unlawful conduct of protesters in an ongoing, fluid protest such as 
that at a particular clinic.129  Under Scalia’s reasoning, a person 
seeking an injunction to monitor the conduct of protesters would be 
required to return to the court each time a new individual protester 
appeared on the scene.130  Rehnquist’s argument is stronger, but 
there is certainly a difficulty; it is somewhat troubling (and, some 
courts would undoubtably hold, unlawful) to hold a person to the 
standards of a court order of which she has no notice and in which 
she was not named.131 
For example, a New Jersey injunction restricted the protest activities 
of an organization called “Helpers” and all those acting in concert 
with it.132  Based on repeated violations of the order by a protester 
                                                          
 128. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762 (explaining that an injunction against a specific 
group is based on that group’s past actions in a real dispute).  Scalia might think this 
a good result; it is unclear why Rehnquist thinks it a bad one. 
 129. See id. at 763 (suggesting that it is the conduct of individual protestors at a 
specific place, not the group’s views, that violate an injunction).  Because the conduct 
is what is enjoined by the injunction, not the views of the protestors, the court would 
be unable to issue an injunction against recurring unlawful conduct at a specific place 
because it would be construed as content-based.  Id. 
 130. See Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 723 A.2d 611, 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999) (asserting that injunctions would be rendered ineffective if groups 
and individuals could avoid the injunction by sending new groups and individuals to 
the site). 
 131. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 
57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that notice is a requirement to include an individual 
within the ambit of an injunction in which he is not named). 
 132. See Horizon Health Ctr., 723 A.2d at 611, 613 (noting that membership in 
Helpers was not required for the injunction to apply).  The New Jersey appellate 
court overturned the lower court’s refusal to expand the injunction.  Id. at 612.  The 
court found that “acting in concert or participation with” the enjoined parties meant 
that the defendant knowingly violated the injunction’s provisions.  Id.  Therefore, 
those participating with the parties to the injunction, with knowledge of the 
injunction’s existence, were bound by the injunction as well.  Id. at 613.  The court 
found that to be effective, the injunction had to be construed this way.  Id. Adopting 
the lower court’s interpretation would render the injunction useless because 
protesters could not be restrained if the clinic could not meet the heavy burden of 
18
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who did not belong to Helpers, the clinic asked the court to broaden 
the injunction.133  The court refused to do so, holding that to 
broaden the injunction against Helpers and those acting in concert 
with it required plaintiffs to show the protester either belonged to 
Helpers or was directed or assisted by its members.134 
Can this problem be solved?  In 1996, a California state court 
enjoined an organization, one named respondent, and “all persons 
acting in concert or participation with them, or either of them, and 
all persons with actual notice of this Judgment” from various abortion 
protest-related activities.135  In 2001, Planned Parenthood sought 
declaratory relief to apply the injunction to protesters not named in 
the original suit.136  Planned Parenthood alleged that, while not 
named in the original injunction, the respondents had been served 
with a copy of the injunction and therefore were bound by it.137  
Planned Parenthood’s motion for summary judgment was granted.138 
The First District appellate court overturned the ruling.139  The 
appellate court found the notice provision was unconstitutional 
because it sought to apply the injunction against anyone, not simply 
those who acted “in concert with” the named defendants.140  The 
court found that an injunction could only be enforced against the 
person to whom it was directed, against a class of persons to which 
that person belongs, or against someone aiding, abetting, or acting on 
that person’s behalf.141  The court remanded the case for findings of 
                                                          
proving membership or direction by Helpers.  Id.  Each individual protester would 
have to have an injunction specifically directed against her.  Id.  (stating that the 
purpose of the injunction was to protect Horizon and its patients and not to punish 
members of Helpers). 
 133. See id. at 612 (asking the court to include in the injunction “and/or persons 
and organizations affiliated, acting in concert or participation with, or on behalf” of 
Helpers). 
 134. See id. (reasoning that to do otherwise would violate the due process rights of 
alleged, non-member violators). 
 135. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n. v. Operation Rescue, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 744 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the fifteen-foot buffer zone at the clinic but reversing 
the 250 feet zone at the doctor’s residence and the ban from approaching workers 
and patients due to the availability of a less restrictive approach). 
 136. See Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (alleging that the defendants acted in 
concert and participation with Operation Rescue). 
 137. See id. at 50-51 (arguing that actual notice of the injunction renders the 
defendants bound by the injunction). 
 138. See id. at 51 (finding the defendants bound by the injunction as a matter of 
law). 
 139. See id. at 57 (reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo). 
 140. See id. at 53-54 (stating that to apply an injunction to all anti-abortion 
protestors, rather than basing it on an individual’s relationship to the enjoined party, 
would render the injunction content-based and contrary to the First Amendment). 
 141. See id. at 52 (holding that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction and notice are not enough 
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fact on whether other demonstrators did in fact act “in concert with” 
the named defendants.142 
The problem, of course, is that once a particular protester has been 
specifically enjoined by name or by membership in an enjoined 
organization, he may simply move on to another facility and be 
replaced by another protester, who is free to act as she wants.143  The 
petitioners will need to go back to court for each protester and prove 
that protester’s link to the enjoined parties.144  Should petitioners 
even have the time and resources for this, they will find it a further 
challenge to prove that an injunction is even required: they would 
have to come up with some kind of evidence to prove that the 
individual protester would violate the party’s rights again.145 
It would seem that, if Scalia’s argument were accepted, any number 
of aggrieved parties could lose their right to seek redress in the courts, 
and their only recourse would be to organize themselves into a group 
large enough to encourage legislators to act.  We saw the result of this 
approach in Hill and CF&I Steel.  Even if such a legislative enactment 
could pass constitutional muster, it still would likely not address the 
problem that the party seeking the injunction is being injured right 
now and will continue to suffer injury until the legislative body acts.  
Even were they successful, they would still have no private right of 
action under statutes such as the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act, and they would have to rely on government enforcers 
to protect them.146 
                                                          
to subject a person to the restraint of an injunction”).  “The order must be directed 
against that person, either by naming that person as an individual or by designating a 
class of persons to which that person belongs.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 142. See id. at 57 (noting that although actual notice is not sufficient, it is still 
required). 
 143. But see Madsen, 512 U.S. at 802-03 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
[T]he right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely 
because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or 
advocated doctrine that itself is not protected . . . . [M]ere association with 
[a] group—absent a specific intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by 
that group—is an insufficient predicate for liability. 
Id. (quoting Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 925-26). 
 144. See, e.g., Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (requiring proof of participation with 
the named party and actual notice of the injunction). 
 145. See U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (mandating proof of a 
“cognizable danger of recurrent violation” for the issuance of an injunction). 
 146. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(A) (1994) (providing a right of action to 
individuals “obtaining or seeking to obtain” services in a facility). This requirement 
eliminates the ability to sue after the individual received services at the facility.  Id. 
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C.  Should Speech-Restrictive Injunctions Receive Stricter Scrutiny 
than Speech-Restrictive Laws? 
After determining that the Madsen injunction was content-neutral, 
Rehnquist garnered only four additional votes for his further 
reasoning that an injunctive order should be judged by a slightly 
stricter standard than an ordinance.147  Rehnquist found that 
injunctions carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory 
application.148  His rationale for this finding is not clearly set out, but 
presumably, Rehnquist would argue that injunctions pose greater risks 
to free speech because they are targeted toward particular entities and 
particular speech, and they are brought by particular entities who feel 
they have been injured.149  However, this danger would seem to be 
(and is, to Stevens) mitigated by Rehnquist’s next observation: that 
injunctions are usually designed to punish for a violation of a prior 
law or court order.150  In contrast, a generally applicable ordinance 
simply represents a legislative choice about promoting social 
interests.151 
In his partial concurrence, Scalia agreed with the outcome, but not 
the reasoning: rather than articulating a new standard for content-
neutral injunctions, Scalia argued, the Court should simply find that 
injunctions like the one at bar are content-based and judge them 
under strict scrutiny, thus avoiding the need for an entirely new tier of 
scrutiny. 152  Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens 
                                                          
 147. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 (concurring Justices included O’Connor, 
Blackmun, Ginsburg, and Souter). 
 148. See id. (touching upon how injunctions lend themselves more to arbitrary 
and unreasonable government than do statutes). 
 149. See id. (stating that “[t]here is no more effective practical guaranty against 
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law 
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally”) (quoting 
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)). 
 150. See id. at 765 (conceding that injunctions have some advantages over 
statutes).  This is troublesome language because in the theoretical case, no one 
should be “punished” for exercising her constitutional rights.  Compare id. at 794 n.1 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that restricting First 
Amendment rights due to prior misconduct is an unprecedented form of 
punishment), with id. at 778 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that deprivation of liberty is a “remedy” for prior misconduct and not a 
form of punishment). The concept sounds less draconian in the case of Garibaldi, in 
which the court asserts that the defendants are being enjoined because they abused 
their rights previously.  132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53. 
 151. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 (concluding that the ordinance poses more of a 
danger to First Amendment rights). 
 152. See id. at 791-92 (claiming that the difference between intermediate scrutiny 
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concurred with the holding that the injunction was content-
neutral.153  He also agreed that injunctions should be subject to a 
different standard of First Amendment scrutiny than should 
ordinances.154  However, Stevens argued that injunctions should be 
scrutinized more leniently, not more strictly.155 
Stevens found that there were several significant differences 
between statutes and injunctions that justified the use of a different 
standard.  First, while statutes were imposed on large groups of 
people, injunctions applied “solely to an individual or a limited group 
of individuals who, by engaging in illegal conduct, have been 
judicially deprived of some liberty—the normal consequence of illegal 
activity.”156  Second, under equitable principles an injunction must be 
carefully crafted by the judiciary to address the specific activities that 
justify it; Stevens argued that a more lenient standard should 
therefore be used in order to give deference to the issuing court’s 
more intimate knowledge of those specific facts.157 
Scalia disagreed with using a more lenient standard because of 
deference to the trial court, but he indicated that an injunction does 
necessitate different treatment than a law.158  In his dissent he stated, 
“the judicial creation of a [zone] in which only a particular group, 
which had broken no law, cannot exercise its rights of speech” is at 
odds with the First Amendment and the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence (emphasis added).159  While the differentiation 
between law-breakers and those who have not broken any law is 
                                                          
and the new test created by the Court was “frankly too subtle for me to describe”).  
Scalia deemed the new standard “intermediate-intermediate scrutiny.”  Id. at 791. 
 153. See id. at 782 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joining 
part II of the majority opinion). 
 154. See id. at 778 (framing the issue as comparing “generally applicable 
legislation” as “judicial remedies for proven wrongdoing”). 
 155. See id. (basing this conclusion on a judge’s ability to sanction a repeat 
offender by way of injunction the way a legislator could not sanction the community 
at large by statute). 
 156. Id. (concluding that while an ordinance restricting protest may be 
unconstitutional, an injunction for the same acts may be valid). The Garibaldi court 
also relied on this reasoning: “Indeed, [an injunction] may ‘deprive the enjoined 
parties of rights others enjoy precisely because the enjoined parties have abused those 
rights in the past.’”  132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52 (quoting People v. Conrad, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 248, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 157. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 779 (applying the facts of the case where the trial 
judge heard three days of testimony before rendering a decision). 
 158. See id. at 793 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
that a lower court’s permanent or expanded injunctions should be closely scrutinized 
because the court, when expanding the order or making it permanent, will be angry 
with respondents/defendants for defying its previous orders). 
 159. See id. at 785 (introducing the main theme of his dissent). 
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dictum, it suggests at least some agreement with Stevens’ viewpoint.160  
This viewpoint would indicate that injunctions issued in response to 
violations of laws such as the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act (“FACE”) should receive more lenient scrutiny, not 
stricter scrutiny.161 
Scalia’s argument for strict scrutiny is attractive, if only because it 
refuses to further muddy the waters on this point.  Deciding what level 
of scrutiny to apply is often somewhat arbitrary, as this case shows.162  
Nevertheless, Stevens’ logic is more persuasive because it seems 
antithetical to provide greater protection to those who have already 
abused their rights.163  Hill makes this clear; the statute at issue in that 
case places quite extensive and complicated restrictions on people 
who have not yet demonstrated that they cannot exercise their rights 
without trampling on someone else’s.164  It is difficult to comprehend 
how this is less troubling than an injunction targeted against 
particular individuals. 
                                                          
 160. Compare id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(asserting that injunctions apply to those who have engaged in past illegal conduct), 
with id. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that 
groups do not break the law by asserting their First Amendment rights). 
 161. For cases analyzing injunctions issued pursuant to FACE, 18 U.S.C. § 248 
(1994), see, e.g., U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 927 (8th Cir. 1996) (employing the 
Madsen standard of scrutiny to find part of the injunction violated the First 
Amendment); Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 605-07 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming a 
twenty-five foot buffer zone from the clinic and reversing a 100 foot zone from the 
doctor’s residence and a floating twenty foot buffer from the doctor’s person); U.S. v. 
Scott, 187 F.3d 282, 287 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming an expanded buffer zone due to 
repeated violations of the first injunction by the defendant); U.S. v. Mahoney, 247 
F.3d 279, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating as overbroad an injunction that prohibited 
defendants from going within twenty feet of any reproductive health facility within 
the Capital Beltway); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue, 273 F.3d 184, 203 
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding an injunction violates First Amendment rights because it was 
broader than necessary to address the state’s interests); Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (upholding an injunction as not infringing upon First Amendment rights 
that prohibited defendants from threatening plaintiff doctors through “wanted” 
posters). 
 162. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (describing the difficulty in applying the new and ill-defined standard put forth 
by the majority). 
 163. See id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (basing a 
lesser standard of scrutiny on a judge’s ability and power to determine individual 
culpability). 
 164. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999). 
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such 
person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a 
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, 
education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or 
sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to 
a health care facility. 
§ 18-9-122(3). 
23
Keast: Injunction Junction: Enjoining Free Speech After Madsen, Schenck,
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004
KEAST.DOC 9/16/2004  1:54 PM 
296 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 12:2 
D.  Can the Court Assume State Interests that Haven’t Been Pled, and 
What Role Can Those Interests Play? 
In Madsen, Rehnquist noted that the Florida Supreme Court found 
that the state had a strong interest in protecting a woman’s freedom 
to seek lawful medical services relating to her pregnancy.165  The state 
also had interests in maintaining public safety and order, keeping 
traffic moving on public streets and sidewalks, and protecting citizens’ 
property rights.166  Rehnquist held those state interests “quite 
sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect 
them.”167  The defendants in Schenck argued that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to injunctive relief because the plaintiffs did not identify 
any state interests in their pleading.168  Rehnquist stated that “in 
assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court looks not only at the 
private claims asserted in the complaint, but also inquires into the 
governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which 
may include an interest in public safety and order.”169  The Court 
held that, given its factual similarity to Madsen, the Schenck 
injunction was justified by the same governmental interests: ensuring 
public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets 
and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s 
freedom to seek pregnancy related medical services.170 
Scalia dissented.171  The Court’s “opinion . . . claims for the 
judiciary a prerogative I have never heard of: the power to render 
decrees that are in its view justified by concerns for public safety, 
though not justified by the need to remedy the grievance that is the 
subject of the lawsuit.”172  Scalia acknowledged that some remedial 
options were eliminated in Madsen because of public safety concerns, 
but he found that to be quite different from the Court’s action in 
Schenck, in which, he argued, public safety provided part of the 
justification for the remedy itself and was not merely a tool for setting 
                                                          
 165. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767-68 (listing the various significant governmental 
interests protected by the injunction). 
 166. Id. at 768. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 374 (claiming, therefore, that only one of seven 
claims survived the lower court’s decision). 
 169. Id. at 375 (concluding that a plaintiff need not plead the state interest in the 
complaint). 
 170. See id. at 376 (comparing violations of private rights with violations of public 
order).  The latter is a public right enforced by the state and therefore plaintiffs do 
not need to allege it in the complaint.  Id. 
 171. Id. at 385-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joining Justice 
Scalia were Justices Kennedy and Thomas). 
 172. Id. at 385-86 (introducing the main reason for his dissent). 
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the scope of that remedy.173 
As he did in Madsen, Scalia debated whether any law had actually 
been violated which would thus justify injunctive relief.174  Scalia 
disagreed with the District Court’s assertion that the Schenck 
plaintiffs’ injunction was justified because they were likely to succeed 
on the merits of their claims.175  In addition, Scalia again asserted that 
the holdings of Claiborne require that when reviewing injunctions, 
especially those restricting free speech, a court must closely examine 
the findings for support of those restrictions.176  Not only did the 
Court abandon this duty, but, Scalia argued, Rehnquist substituted his 
own assessments of past violations and future probabilities for those of 
the lower court.177 
Scalia found this particularly disturbing because of the privacy 
rights relied upon by the lower court in crafting the injunction:178 
while the injunction was nominally based on a (questionable) right to 
unimpeded access to clinics, Scalia felt the District Court also 
supported the injunction with a “generalized right ‘to be left 
alone.’”179 
In particular, Scalia found that the terms of the injunction “ma[d]e 
no attempt to conceal” that the cease and desist provision, which 
                                                          
 173. See id. at 393 (reasoning that the Court’s concern with public safety raised 
separation of powers difficulties because the executive branch is charged with 
protecting public safety). 
 174. Compare Madsen, 512 U.S. at 805-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in 
part, dissenting in part) (explaining that the Court failed to explain how the 
defendants violated a Florida law or injunction), with Schenck, 519 U.S. at 391-92 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (questioning the discriminatory 
nature of the state trespassing law and rejecting the lower court’s determination 
regarding the merits of the claim). 
 175. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 391-92 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (presenting contrary and controlling Supreme Court precedent). 
 176. See id. at 389-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (reciting 
precedent requiring a speech-restrictive injunction to be “‘supported by findings that 
adequately disclose their evidentiary basis . . . that carefully identify the impact of [the 
defendants’] unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the 
imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity’” (quoting NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1992))). 
 177. See id. at 389 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (rejecting 
the Court’s analogy to the proposition that appellate courts can affirm trial courts on 
different legal grounds). 
 178. See id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining 
that the District Court was clear in upholding the injunction on the right to be left 
alone rather than a right to unobstructed access to clinics). 
 179. Compare id. at 383 (stating that the lower court’s basis did not accurately 
reflect Supreme Court precedent on a “right to be left alone”), with id. at 388-89 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (claiming that the Court ignored 
the District Court’s basis for upholding the injunction: a nonexistent right to be left 
alone). 
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required “sidewalk counselors” to retreat outside the buffer zone if 
the patient indicated she did not wish to be counseled, was based on a 
supposed right to be left alone.180  Scalia felt the injunction could not 
be analyzed without keeping that emphasis in mind, because “unduly 
burdensome” is a balancing test assessed, in part, by the right the 
restriction protects,181 and a “right” the Court has arguably 
disclaimed should not be given much weight in that balancing. 
The majority did denounce the concept of a “right to be left alone,” 
but Scalia argued that it was impossible to reverse the lower court on 
what he considered this central point and still find that the injunction 
could pass the balancing test required by Madsen.182  Rather than 
actually confront this issue, argued Scalia, Rehnquist made it 
irrelevant by abdicating Claiborne’s requirement of reviewing the 
facts, essentially by ignoring what the District Court actually found 
and deciding what it was “entitled” to find, then upholding the 
injunction on those grounds.183 
An important theoretical issue raised by the Schenck opinion 
involves the very nature of injunctive relief itself: whose interests are 
being protected?  Scalia argued in Schenck that the “Court’s 
opinion . . . claims for the judiciary a prerogative I have never heard 
of: the power to render decrees that are in its view justified by 
concerns for public safety, though not justified by the need to remedy 
the grievance that is the subject of the lawsuit.”184  Rehnquist 
characterized Scalia’s opinion as arguing that reliance on “public 
safety” is impermissible because only the government can seek an 
injunction based on that factor.185  Rehnquist concluded that the 
District Court had not used public safety itself as a justification for the 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the 
District Court’s approval of such terms).  The Colorado Supreme Court discussed a 
“right to be let alone” wrapped in the right to privacy in its opinion in Hill, 973 P.2d 
at 1253. 
 181. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765 (balancing speech restrictions by an 
injunction and the significant governmental interests protected by the injunction). 
 182. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(explaining that the Madsen test to “burden no more speech than necessary” only 
protects “legitimate governmental interests”) (emphasis in original). 
 183. See id. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (denouncing 
the Court’s approach generally, but especially when it involves First Amendment 
rights). 
 184. See id. at 385-86 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(recognizing a difference between eliminating remedies because of conflicts with 
public safety and justifying a remedy on the basis of public safety). 
 185. See id. at 376 n.7 (discussing the difficulty a private individual has in alleging 
violations of public rights). 
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injunction, but simply as a factor in the constitutional analysis.186 
Rehnquist has the stronger logic on this point.  The District Court 
did craft the injunction based both on plaintiffs’ private rights and on 
public interests.187  However, it is solely the plaintiffs’ interests that 
give rise to the need for relief.188  State interests are necessary to 
constitutional analysis because the state will be enforcing the 
injunction via the police and the courts.189  However, the state’s 
interests, such as promoting the free flow of traffic, only affect the 
scope and details of the injunction.190 
If a restrictive injunction were necessary to afford plaintiff relief but 
the state had no interest in enforcing the injunction, it is probable 
that the injunction would not be enforced.  The plaintiff, therefore, 
could only be effectively protected if the state decided to sue, not in 
the plaintiff’s interest, but in the public interest.191  Political pressure, 
as well as scarce resources, could severely limit the state’s ability to do 
so in all but the most exceptional cases.192  As a result, a potentially 
very large group of individual plaintiffs would be unable to protect 
themselves from illegal activity. 
The debate over state interests and their proper role raged on in 
Hill.  Stevens cited as the state’s interests in Hill one of those that the 
Colorado Supreme Court relied on: protecting the health and safety 
of the state’s citizens.193  Like the Colorado Supreme Court, Stevens 
                                                          
 186. See id. (asserting that a court can rely on public safety to assess the First 
Amendment argument). 
 187. See id. at 369 (holding the injunction served three significant governmental 
interests: public safety, a woman’s constitutional rights to interstate travel, and a 
woman’s constitutional rights to choose to have an abortion). 
 188. See id. at 362-67 (describing the acts of the defendants, including blockades 
and attempts to disrupt clinic operations and client access, which led plaintiffs to take 
action in the courts for relief). 
 189. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(requiring the state to show a compelling state interest before it could enforce a 
content-based exclusion that could potentially violate First Amendment rights). 
 190. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376 (assessing whether the injunction was 
appropriately tailored in light of the state’s stated interests). 
 191. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1994) (authorizing the 
Attorney General to sue on behalf of individuals to advance the public interest of 
school desegregation, which also enforces individual protections under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. v. Scott, 187 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding for the State on 
behalf of the individual).  In Scott, the state brought suit against the defendant. The 
trial court found that Scott repeatedly used physical obstruction, threats, violence, 
harassment, and sound amplification that made his voice audible inside the clinic. Id. 
at 284. Police officers restrained Scott on twenty occasions and warned him not to 
stand in the clinic’s doorways on forty or fifty occasions. Id. Between 1988 and 1996, 
Scott was arrested fourteen times on charges including harassment and third-degree 
assault.  Id. 
 193. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 (balancing the petitioners’ First Amendment rights 
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also referred to the controversial “right to be let alone” and stated 
that one aspect of that right was “[t]he unwilling listener’s interest in 
avoiding unwanted communication”194—terminology that came 
about in Frisby, when protesters picketed a doctor’s residence.195 
This proved too much for Scalia, who stated that as if it was not 
enough for the Schenck Court to rely on interests the state had not 
pled, the Court in Hill goes on to rely on an interest “not only 
completely different from the interest that the statute specifically sets 
forth; [but an interest] explicitly disclaimed by the State in its brief 
before this Court, and characterized as a ‘straw interest’ petitioners 
served up in the hope of discrediting the State’s case.”196  Scalia 
reminded the Court that just three terms ago, in Schenck, the Court 
expressed doubt that the concept of a right to be let alone was an 
accurate understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence.197 
Although Scalia’s frequently discourteous tone somewhat lessens 
the thrill of supporting his logic, Scalia’s viewpoint is to be expected 
and is not misplaced.  The idea that a court should only decide the 
issues before it is fundamental to American jurisprudence.198  In 
many cases, interests, claims, and arguments not pled are expressly 
waived.199  A reviewing court should be analyzing the issues the 
parties thought were important, not those the court thinks are 
important (or so the argument goes).200  However, while the 
precision of this understanding of the court’s role makes it appealing, 
                                                          
against the legitimate state interests served by the statute).  The Colorado Supreme 
Court also relied on the state’s interest in protecting an individual’s “‘right to protest’ 
or counsel against certain medical procedures” and a person’s “right to obtain 
medical counseling and treatment.”  Id. at 712. 
 194. Id. at 716 (distinguishing between willing and unwilling listeners).  These are 
two radically different statements and Stevens would have done better to stick with 
the latter version’s language because the dissenters seize upon the concept of a “right 
to be let alone” and continue to address it with undisguised scorn.  Id. at 741, 750 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 195. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (discussing the protection of the unwilling listener 
as one aspect of residential privacy rights). 
 196. Hill, 530 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 197. See id. at 750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of trying to find its 
way out of a “jam”); see also supra note 171 (demonstrating the different analyses of 
the Court and the dissenters in Schenck) 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 , cl. 1 (“judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
[and] Controversies.”). 
 199. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (requiring that any counterclaim rising out of 
the same transaction or occurrence be filed or a defendant is waived from bringing it 
in the same or subsequent cases). 
 200. See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 487 (1958) (“Our courts are passive instrumentalities, available 
to right wrong, but the initiative is never theirs.  Our courts require the catalyst of a 
litigant who seeks relief.”). 
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it ignores reality.  The decrial of “judicial activism,” in which courts 
interpret laws using not only their literal text but a variety of factors, 
such as evolving societal norms, is truly bipartisan: conservatives hold 
up Roe v. Wade;201 liberals rally around Bush v. Gore.202  
Nevertheless, even Scalia, who generally prefers to interpret the 
meaning of the Constitution as the framers would have understood it, 
finds it hard to resist the role of judicial activist.203  It would be 
hypocritical to ignore this reality.204  If we must have courts engaging 
in “activism,” it is better that they do so and acknowledge it, rather 
than decry it and then take it up without apparent awareness of the 
discredit such a turnaround casts on their positions. 
E.  How Much Deference to the Issuing Court’s Findings of Fact is 
Appropriate? 
One of the fundamental issues in the efficacy of the Madsen test is 
revealed in the continuing debate between Rehnquist and Scalia and 
addressed in Stevens’ concurrence: since an injunction must be 
tailored carefully to address the facts, how closely is a reviewing court 
supposed to look at those facts?205  Rehnquist’s opinions in Madsen 
and Schenck both reveal substantial deference to the trial court;206 
Scalia, on the other hand, argues that an almost de novo factual 
review is demanded when the injunction restricts free speech.207 
                                                          
 201. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (recognizing a woman’s right to choose to have an 
abortion). 
 202. 531 U.S. 98, 105-10 (2000) (holding that the process for mandatory recounts 
did not meet the non-arbitrary treatment of voters requirement under the Equal 
Protection Clause); see also, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (2001) (questioning whether the five justices in the majority 
ruled because they favored a Bush presidency). 
 203. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 111-22 (joining not only in the majority opinion, 
but also joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion in support of 
additional reasons for reversing the decision of the Florida Supreme Court). 
 204. See William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1244 (accusing the Conservative Court of not engaging in 
judicial activism but rather engaging in hypocrisy). 
 205. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (expressing his belief that a more lenient standard of review should govern First 
Amendment challenges to injunctive relief than the standard applied to legislation). 
 206. See id. at 769-70 (reasoning that the trial court had greater knowledge of the 
facts of the case and the background of the dispute); see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at 
381 (deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the distance needed to keep 
entrances to the clinics clear). 
 207. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 792 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (asserting that a speech-restrictive injunction is “at least” as deserving of strict 
scrutiny as statutory restrictions). Scalia expounds on this argument in his dissent to 
the denial of the second petition for certiorari in Williams v. Planned Parenthood 
Shasta-Diablo, Inc.  After the Supreme Court of California upheld the injunction at 
issue, the defendants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.  In light of the 
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The Madsen plaintiffs’ initial complaint was that the protesters 
blocked access to the clinic by demonstrating where the public street 
gives access to the clinic.208  The original injunction accordingly 
banned the defendants from blocking or interfering with public 
access.209  In the proceedings to broaden the injunction, the court 
found that, in numbers from a handful to four hundred, defendants 
continued to impede access.210 
In his Madsen dissent, Scalia agreed that the interests presented by 
the Court were of the character the state may protect.211  He then 
reminded the majority of its statement that an injunction issues only 
on a past or imminent violation of statutory or common law, and he 
argued that no state law or court order had been violated in 
Madsen.212  The only violation even mentioned in the proceedings at 
the Supreme Court was of the original injunction, which was issued in 
response to defendants’ threats to illegally blockade the clinic.213  
Scalia did not think even this had been violated: it enjoined 
defendants from “blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or 
egress from . . .” the clinic.214  Scalia noted that the state court, in 
broadening the injunction, found that “there has been interference 
with ingress to the petitioners’ facility . . . [in] the form of persons on 
                                                          
Madsen decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
back to the California Supreme Court for reconsideration.  The Supreme Court of 
California upheld the judgment, the defendants appealed again, and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.  “It is not normally our practice to scrutinize the record 
support for the grounds asserted by state courts or lower federal courts as a basis for 
rejecting constitutional claims.  We have, however, sometimes been disposed to do so 
when the abridgement of First Amendment rights was at issue.”  520 U.S. 1133, 1136 
(1997). 
 208. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. 
 209. See id. at 757 (enjoining defendants from also physically abusing people 
entering or leaving the clinic). 
 210. See id. at 758 (listing defendants’ acts as congregating in the street, marching 
in the clinic’s driveways, engaging in “sidewalk counseling,” and making noise that 
ranged from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns). 
 211. See id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing as 
state interests securing a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling 
services, ensuring public safety and order, protecting property rights, protecting 
medical privacy rights and protecting the well-being of a patient held “‘captive’ by 
medical circumstance”). 
 212. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the 
Court deferred too readily to the trial court in its conclusions that a law had been 
violated). 
 213. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757 (recognizing constitutional issues surrounding 
the injunction entered by the Florida Supreme Court). 
 214. See id. at 805 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the original injunction 
prohibited trespassing or interfering with access to abortion clinics; physically abusing 
those entering or leaving the clinics; and attempting or directing other persons to 
take such actions). 
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the paved portions . . . .” of the street in front of the clinic.215 
Scalia also condemned the Court’s ready acceptance of the lower 
court’s finding and berated the Court for what he deemed its failure 
to perform its duty to examine closely the factual basis.  Scalia relies 
on Claiborne for this point.  However, the Claiborne Court did not 
revisit the lower courts’ findings of fact in order to ensure thorough 
analysis.  It did so because the lower courts did not articulate the 
evidence they relied on in making those findings, thereby leaving the 
Claiborne Court unable to apply the relevant facts to those 
findings.216  Citing Meadowmoor Dairies, the Claiborne Court 
emphasized that the Court has the ultimate power to search the 
records in the state courts when the findings of fact are 
“insubstantial.”217 
As previously stated, Scalia denounced the Court’s failure to 
examine the facts closely.218  He spent the first six pages of his dissent 
recounting “the facts” as provided by a videotape provided by the 
plaintiffs which documented the protesters’ activities.219  According 
to Scalia’s observations, the protesters’ activities consisted of a “great 
many forms of expression and conduct . . . includ[ing] singing, 
chanting, praying,  shouting . . . playing . . . music, speeches, peaceful 
picketing . . . handbilling, persuasive speech directed at opposing 
groups, efforts to persuade individuals not to have abortions, personal 
testimony, [and] interviews with the press . . . .”220  However, Scalia 
found that the protesters’ activities did not include any violent acts or 
attempts to impede access to the clinic.221 
Scalia appears to argue that, while one has the right to access, one 
does not have the right to unimpeded access of abortion clinics.222  
                                                          
 215. Id. at 806 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that petitioners were able to avoid 
violating the original injunction while still impeding access to the clinic by using such 
tactics as strategically picketing in front of the driveway leading to the abortion 
clinic). 
 216. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 3430 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor 
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941)). 
 217. Id. at 3431. 
 218. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Scalia’s opinion that the Court too 
readily accepted the holding of the lower court). 
 219. See generally id. at 785-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing in detail the 
videotape footage of the protest). 
 220. See id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the activity justifying the 
amended injunction). 
 221. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that there was no suggestion that the 
protesters used violence or impeded access to the clinic in the videotape or in the 
trial court’s findings). 
 222. See id. at 812-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing reasonable alternative 
restrictions that would impede access to clinics). 
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Before providing for such unimpeded access, Scalia would seem to 
require findings of violence, or of protesters’ intent to actually 
prevent individuals from entering the clinic.223  Lacking such 
findings, the original injunction itself would be invalid, and 
disobedience to that order would not justify a broader injunction.224  
Finally, Scalia argued that only in the context of abortion does the 
Court expand legal doctrine, as in Madsen, to allow such a result.225 
Rehnquist  noted that the videotape was not the only evidence 
before the the trial: the court also held three days of evidentiary 
hearings.226  Rehnquist also seems to suggest that substantial 
deference is appropriate because the defendants declined to put a full 
factual record before the Court.227  Had the defendants done so, it is 
unclear how much scrutiny Rehnquist would have given that 
record.228 
In Schenck, Rehnquist prefaced his deference to the trial court by 
relating the factual details the trial court found.229  Scalia retorted 
that Rehnquist simply was analyzing only what the lower court was 
“entitled” to conclude, not what it actually did conclude.230  
Accordingly, Scalia argued that the Court went beyond deferential 
treatment to abdication in Madsen, substituting its own conclusions 
about what burden was justified for those actually made by the lower 
court.231 
Lower courts appear to be using a very deferential standard in 
reviewing factual findings.  In U.S. v. Dinwiddie, the Eighth Circuit 
                                                          
 223. See id. at 808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the injunction refers to 
intentionally blocking, impeding, or obstructing, and not to temporary obstructions 
that occur as a normal consequence of protests). 
 224. See id. at 809 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment 
protects those who unintentionally impede access to clinics). 
 225. See id. at 784-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting two other Supreme Court 
Justices who believe that the Court has a history of treating issues regarding abortion 
regulations differently from any other type of issue). 
 226. See id. at 770 (noting that the state court’s review of the facts included witness 
testimony). 
 227. See id. at 770-71 (“[defendants] studiously refrained from challenging the 
factual basis for the injunction . . . [they] argued against including the factual record 
as an appendix in the Florida Supreme Court, and never certified a full record.”). 
 228. See id. at 771 (stating that the Court must judge the constitutionality of the 
injunction based on the evidence and testimony available to the state court). 
 229. See 519 U.S. at 373 (adhering to the state court’s familiarity with the facts and 
the background of the dispute). 
 230. See id. at 389 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court’s role is 
not to conclude what decision the trial court should have reached). 
 231. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court chose to approve an 
injunction that the District Court decided not to issue based on all of the facts of the 
case). 
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upheld an injunction pursuant to the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act barring the defendant from using “threats of force.”232  
The appellate court set out the factors for analyzing whether a 
statement constitutes a “threat of force”233 and then relied entirely on 
the district court’s factual findings about the defendants’ 
statements.234  The Eighth Circuit, after quoting those findings, 
upheld the district court’s judgment that the statements at issue did 
constitute “threats of force.”235 
The Eleventh Circuit also showed great deference to the district 
court’s factual findings in Lucero, finding that that defendant’s 
activity “violate[d] the nuisance law because it [was] harassing and 
‘substantially interfere[d]’ with plaintiffs’ lawful activities on the 
Clinic’s premises.”236  The Eleventh Circuit did not, however, review 
those findings, apparently relying on the defendant’s brief to raise 
questions about the facts if such questions existed.237  The court held 
that defendants failed to give “any . . . coherent argument” as to how 
the court had misapplied the law,238 and thus, the court declined to 
review the district court’s application of the law to the facts.239 
Similarly, the Second Circuit summarized and declined to review 
the district court’s factual findings in United States v. Scott,240 and 
stated that the district court “carefully tailored the expanded 
injunction to address the particular facts of this case . . . .”241  The 
dissenting judge reviewed the underlying facts solely to assess the 
injunction’s enforceability based on the relevant widths and distances 
                                                          
 232. 76 F.3d at 929 (upholding an injunction prohibiting the appellant from 
engaging in a number of activities within 500 feet of an abortion clinic). 
 233. See id. at 925 (noting that statements constituting threats of force include 
factors like the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other listeners, whether 
the threat was conditional, whether the threat was communicated directly to the 
victim, whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements to the victim in 
the past, and whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threats 
had a propensity to engage in violence). 
 234. See id. (upholding the District Court’s findings based on the facts of the 
case). 
 235. See id. (describing statements which the defendant made to an abortion 
doctor as threats of force in light of the context in which they were made). 
 236. 121 F.3d 591, 599 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 237. See id. at n.12 (adhering to the defendant’s brief for the questions). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. (ignoring the district court’s interpretation of a distance law since the 
defendants did not raise the issue). 
 240. 187 F.3d 282 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
 241. Id. at 289 (finding that the district court’s broadening of the injunction was 
prudent and not overbroad). 
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between physical structures.242 
In short, while it is not always readily apparent from the appellate 
decisions what “review of the record” means to each court, the level of 
deference accorded to the trial courts’ factual findings is quite high, 
even if the end result is to restrict free speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Scalia contends that expansive doctrines like that of Madsen, 
Schenck, and Hill could only take place in the context of abortion, 
because, to the Court’s majorities in those cases, “abortion is 
different.”243  This raises a valid question: would the holdings in 
Madsen, Schenck, and Hill be the same if the demonstrators being 
enjoined were instead civil rights protesters in the 1960s?244  Perhaps 
not, but the reason is not the viewpoint of the protesters.  It is, quite 
simply, that abortion is different.245 Scalia thinks this unacceptable, 
but arguably free speech and protest in the context of health care 
facilities where physicians perform abortions require special 
treatment.246  White protesters trying to block African-Americans 
from a previously “whites-only” lunch counter or union protesters 
trying to block “scabs” from crossing the picket line surely affect many 
of their targets emotionally and physically.247  However, abortion 
demonstrations can emotionally and physically affect medical patients 
about to undergo a variety of medical procedures, each not without 
physical risk.248  The Supreme Court has found that medical 
testimony supports the conclusion that high-stress situations, such as 
passing through a vigorous demonstration outside the door of the 
doctor’s office, can be dangerous to a patient’s health.249  The 
constitution requires listeners to put up with some offensive speech in 
                                                          
 242. See id. at 289-92 (reviewing the facts solely as they applied to the “floating 
buffer zone”). 
 243. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 741-42 (noting the expansion of restrictions 
surrounding the right to persuade women contemplating abortions to forego them). 
 244. See supra note 114 (comparing abortion protesters with civil rights 
protesters). 
 245. See supra pages 278-82 (noting the expansive doctrine in the abortion cases). 
 246. See supra note 116 (noting that Scalia even gives credence to the idea that 
abortion “is different”). 
 247. See id. (recognizing that varying levels of trauma result depending on the 
context of the protest). 
 248. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting the medical risks associated 
with patients exposed to abortion protests). 
 249. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758 (noting that many patients faced with protests can 
manifest high levels of anxiety or hypertension, causing them to need higher levels of 
sedation, which, in turn, increases the risk of the surgical procedures). 
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order to protect the First Amendment; rights must, after all, be 
balanced.250  But “balance” should not require a listener to put her 
own health at risk so that another may speak freely.251 
Madsen, Schenck and Hill have provided courts with some 
guidance for drafting constitutionally sound injunctions governing 
demonstrators.252  However, this attempt at guidance has created new 
difficulties of its own.  While currently still limited to abortion cases 
and a few labor matters, as long as Americans value protest, the issues 
raised in this paper inevitably will come up in suits outside this 
context.  Recognizing that abortion is “different” could limit the 
prospective breadth of Madsen’s analysis on consideration of health 
risks, but the Court has ruled out such precision by finding that 
women seeking abortions are not a protected class.253  Barring the 
precedent to support such precision, Madsen’s sweep could be broad 
indeed. 
 
                                                          
 250. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (setting forth the weighing of 
interests in First Amendment analysis). 
 251. See supra pages 282-83 (explaining the balancing analysis used by the 
Supreme Court in Madsen). 
 252. See supra pages 282-93 (noting the analysis in Madsen, Schenck, and Hill). 
 253. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) 
(observing that a “class” is something more than a group of people who engage in 
similar conduct). 
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